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NEW RULES COMING ON PAYMENT OF WAGES IN-KIND
— by Neil E. Harl*
 In our earlier articles on the payment of wages in kind,1
we noted that payment of wages in kind rather than in cash
to agricultural labor has not been subject to FICA2 or
FUTA3 tax for dseveral years. Moreover, payments to
agricultural labor are exempt from income tax withholding4
except as the payments constitute wages.5 Wages paid, in
any medium other than cash for agricultural labor, are
exempt from the term wages.6 Further, payments in kind to
agricultural laborers are not considered wages for purposes
of determining the amount of earnings in retirement.7
Recent IRS rulings
Since 1979, the Internal Revenue Service has often
objected to use of the provision involving FICA tax on the
ground that the payment was in a form readily converted to
cash and should be considered a cash wage payment8 or the
arrangement failed to give the employee dominion and
control over the commodity serving as the payment in kind.9
Under the latter theory, a compensation arrangement
whereby a spouse was paid $200 in cash and 3,000 pounds
of live hogs per month was held to be the equivalent of a
payment in cash where the title to the hogs was transferred
to the spouse on delivery to market.10 In a 1993 ruling,
payment to the husband in a family -owned farm corporation
in the form of $6,000 in cash wages and 20 percent of all
market-weight butcher hogs which produced $6,000 in cash
and $34,941 in hogs one year and $11,000 in cash and
$41,272 of hogs the following year was all considered to be
the equivalent of cash compensation.11 An earlier ruling, in
1982, involving the payment of wages in the form of milk
and other commodities by a corporation carrying on a dairy
operation, met the requirements for avoiding payroll taxes in
a situation where employees were compensated with a
percentage of the milk produced, a percentage of the calves
and a percentage of grain production.12
In the latest ruling, payments were made in the form of
grain to a married couple who were employees of their
wholly-owned farm corporation and were treated as the
equivalent of cash.13 The grain was not removed to separate
storage facilities nor was the couple charged for storage,
although the couple bore the risk of loss after payment of the
wages and sold the grain independently.14 The grain was
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retained for periods ranging from one and one-half to two
and one-half months before the sale occurred.15 The ruling
notes that “...the intent at the time of the [wage payment]
was to convert the grain into cash.”16
Increasing the odds for success
Recent discussions involving IRS representatives, tax
practitioners and academics involving this highly
contentious issue indicate that guidelines should be
published some time in the next several months outlining the
major factors that must be met if a taxpayer is to be
successful in avoiding payroll taxes by payment of wages in
kind. Here are the principal factors —
• Whether the payment involves grain or livestock, it is
important to isolate the commodity from that of the
employer, preferably removing the commodity to the
employee's facilities. If left in the employer's facilities, it is
important that the employee bear all costs of care, storage,
feeding and management.
• It is highly important for the employee to bear the risks
of loss as well as the risks of price change.
• The transfer of the commodity to the employee should
be carefully documented in writing with releases obtained
for any security interests placed on the commodity by the
employer.
• The decision to and the details of sale should all be
handled by the employee and should be completely
independent from the marketing decisions by the employer.
Resale by the employee to the employer is viewed in highly
negative terms.
• The commodity used for wage payment must have
been produced or purchased for use in the trade or business
and not purchased for the purpose of wage payment.
• Sufficient time should elapse between payment as
wages by the employer and sale by the employee for the
employee to establish dominion and control over the
commodity.
In effect, the expected guidelines will lay out conditions
to be met for a wage payment in commodities to be
considered bona fide.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a $15,000
homestead exemption for a residence which they owned as
tenants by the entireties. After subtracting a first and second
mortgage on the house, the debtors had $14,400 in equity.
The debtors sought to avoid a judicial lien against the house
as impairing their exemption. The judicial creditor argued
that the lien could be avoided only to the extent the lien
impaired the exemption, i.e., $600. The court upheld its own
established rule that if the debtor’s remaining equity in
exempt property was less than the allowable exemption, any
avoidable lien would be completely avoided. The court
noted that its past decisions were cited with approval by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
In re Cross, 164 B.R. 496 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and claimed an exemption
in a homestead. The debtor’s equity in the house was less
than the available exemption amount and the debtor sought
to avoid a judgment lien as impairing the debtor’s
exemption. The judgment creditor argued that, under Illinois
law, judgment liens do not attach to the homeowner’s
exemption amount; therefore, the judgment lien did not
impair the exemption. The court agreed with the creditor
and allowed the judgment lien to continue against the
homestead. In re Harrison, 164 B.R. 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1994).
The debtor had received a discharge in March 1987 and
the case was closed in June 1987. In September 1993, the
debtor requested a reopening of the case to avoid a judicial
lien on exempt property. The court noted that no time limit
was set by statute or court rules for filing avoidance actions
but held that more than six years was too long. The court
also established a court rule that avoidance actions be filed
within 60 days after the first date for meeting of the
creditors. In re Hunter, 164 B.R. 738 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1994).
HOMESTEAD. Within two months before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor conveyed the homestead to the
debtor’s son for “love and affection” at a time when the
debtor was insolvent and the debtor had $27,000 of equity in
the house. The debtor did not list the house on the
bankruptcy property schedules or claim the homestead as
exempt. The trustee learned about the transfer and told the
debtor to list any interest in the house. Three days later the
son conveyed the house back to the debtor for “love and
affection.” The debtor then claimed a homestead exemption
for the house. The trustee sought denial of the exemption
because the property was recovered by the trustee and the
property had been fraudulently conveyed by the debtor. The
debtor argued that the property was not “recovered by the
trustee” because the trustee had not filed any formal motion
to recover the house. The court held that the debtor’s
homestead exemption would be denied because the
conveyance of the house to the son was a voidable
preferential transfer and was recovered by the estate through
the trustee’s actions. In re Glass, 164 B.R. 759 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had operated a citrus nursery
as a partnership with the creditor. After the creditor filed a
suit for an accounting, alleging fraud, theft and breach of
contract, the parties reached a settlement. The settlement
provided for a promissory note from the debtor to the
creditor, secured by the current inventory of trees. The
debtor made two payments and sold the entire nursery to a
third party who agreed to make the sale subject to the
security interest held by the creditor. However, the trees
were quarantined and eventually destroyed by the state
because of citrus canker. Although the third party received
compensation for the trees, the debtor was not paid and the
debtor could not pay the creditor. The creditor sought
nondischargeability of the debt for willful and malicious
injury because the debtor sold the collateral trees in
violation of the security agreement. The court held that the
evidence did not demonstrate any willful or malicious intent
by the debtor because the debtor did make payments when
possible and made the sale of the trees subject to the
security interest. In re Jenkins, 164 B.R. 700 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The Chapter 12 debtor had
substantially completed all plan payments and had filed a
Final Report and Account in preparation for requesting a
final discharge. Two creditors and the trustee objected to the
Final Report, arguing that all disposable income had not
been paid. The debtor’s counsel filed an interim fee
application for services rendered in litigating the disposable
income issue. The trustee and creditors objected to the fee
application, arguing that attorney’s fees should be paid by
the debtor individually and not from the estate after the
